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Abstract: The verification of a person’s identity is very important in today’s information 
society, especially in e-commerce systems and directly affects user account management and 
administration. Although present e-commerce systems use many modern sophisticated methods of 
authentication, large numbers of e-commerce systems use passwords for this purpose incessantly. 
However, passwords are not considered be too secure because users usually do not adhere to 
security policies for creating and managing theirs passwords. This problem can be solved by 
security policies that require the user to change the password frequently, select a completely new 
password, and structure the password, which places additional demands on the user. The solution 
is a two-factor authentication where a user needs to know the right password and at the same 
time, he must write this password in the correct way. Indeed, many different methods for keystroke 
dynamics authentication exist nowadays, but unfortunately, many of them need a large number 
of samples to create a stable template and therefore it is impossible use them in systems whose 
security policy requires frequent password change. The authors suggest a completely new method 
for these purposes that is enough stable even with a small number of measurements to create a 
template. This proposed method of keystroke dynamics authentication is validated and results are 
compared with existing methods both over the own dataset and the existing reference datasets. 
The authors believe that the proposed method will simplify the management and administration of 
user accounts as well as their security.
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Introduction
The ubiquitous Internet connectivity has led 
to the introduction of an ever-increasing list of 
diverse online services ranging from financial 
transactions to online gaming and the other 
e-commerce purposes. For example, with cloud 
computing on the rise, geographically distant 
employees of organizations are able to access 
and share sensitive organizational resources 
online. The mentioned trend has increased the 
amount of user authentication processes.
The aim of authentication is to decide 
whether a subject in question is in fact the 
subject that he claims to be. As an example 
can be mentioned traditional authentication, 
when end users authenticate themselves on 
computers by using the pair of username and 
password. In the past, many sophisticated 
authentication methods were developed. 
Generally, they can by divided to the three basic 
types of authentication depending on what kind 
of identification feature is used: authentication 
by knowledge, authentication by ownership of 
something, and authentication by biometrics. 
Each of these ways has its advantages and 
disadvantages. For example authentication 
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by passwords (“something to know”) is easy 
to implement and it is widely accepted by end 
users but it is not considered be too safe (Hub, 
2003; Stallings, 2012). Many client/server 
applications use a user’s ID and password for 
authentication, for example, when remotely 
logging onto a supplier’s web database and/
or bank systems. In all these applications, it is 
often possible for an attacker to intercept the 
password and then replay it to the server. Of 
course, this replay problem can be overcome 
by using a system called a “onetime password 
system” (OTP) when a password is generated 
by a separate device or distributed by another 
communication channel (Haller et al., 1998; 
Hoque, 2014; Soh & Joy, 2003). An OTP system 
generates a different password for each time of 
authentication. However, in this contribution, 
the authors do not use the OTP method and 
show that there exist an option to use the old 
password system with an acceptable level 
of security that does not need for example a 
mobile phone to receive an OTP password.
It is well known that different authentication 
methods can be combined together to 
strengthen the strengths and eliminate the 
shortcomings of each authentication methods 
and thus increase the security level of the 
authentication. In this context, we talk about 
two, respectively three-factor authentication. An 
example is an ATM where you need to have the 
appropriate bankcard and know the appropriate 
PIN.
To solve the problem of not very secure 
passwords we focused on the combination 
of passwords and keystroke dynamics 
authentication (KDA) based on the principle 
that every person has a different method of 
keyboard typing (Legget et al., 1990; Liu et al., 
2015). This two-factor authentication process 
involves two steps. Firstly, the character string 
of the typed password is compared with that 
of the valid user’s recorded password. If they 
match, the system evaluates the similarity 
between the given typing sample and the 
stored typing patterns (a template) of the valid 
user. If this similarity is large enough, user’s 
identity is accepted and access to the system 
is granted to the user. Otherwise, the user’s 
identity is rejected. This idea is not entirely 
new, but at present, the application of this two-
factor authentication is limited by the limitations 
of existing KDA methods, which require a 
large number of samples to reliably identity 
verification.
The aim of this paper is to present a new 
method of KDA, which gives reliable results even 
in the case of a small number of measurements 
for creating a template. Our proposed method 
is especially suitable for systems whose 
security policy requires frequent change of 
password and end users cannot be asked for 
multiple passwords entering when creating a 
KDA template.
This article is structured as follows. The first 
chapter provides an overview of the current 
state of all of the areas that are important 
for the purpose of this article. The second 
chapter deal with proposed method based 
on a rectangular system, using Pythagoras’ 
formula contains the formal definition of the 
proposed approach. The third chapter provides 
verification of the proposed methods. We 
choose for verifications six possible passwords 
(dA7upR0k, eagle512, ext25ra8, eXt25rA8, 
facebook, standard), the verification procedure 
in detail is contained in this chapter. The next 
chapter deal with comparison our method with 
Killoury and Maxion datasets. The fifth chapter 
discusses the proposed approach including a 
summary of its advantages and disadvantages 
in the context of the current state of this issue. 
The final chapter summarizes this article and 
outlines the possible future research in this 
area.
1. Background and Related Work
Keystroke dynamics authentication (KDA) is 
a behavioral biometric authentication method 
that verify identity of a keyboard user via 
his keyboard typing habits, when a string 
of characters is typed. It is similar to one’s 
signature. During keyboard typing, different 
measures can be measured. Nowadays, 
durations of a key press and the intervals 
between two key presses usually constitute 
a keystroke dynamic because measuring of 
these features do not need a special keyboard 
such as placing your finger on the key or the 
intensity of a keystroke.
KDA has been proposed and developed 
in many papers and patents for decades. 
Although it has a long history dating back to the 
use of telegraph in the 19th century and Morse 
code in the Second World War, new methods 
are still emerging. Most of the prior work still 
focuses on static text; i.e., all users type the 
same text. Only a few efforts have addressed 
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the issue of free text (when a user can type an 
arbitrary text) which is necessary for continuous 
authentication (Gunetti & Picardi, 2005; Kang & 
Cho, 2015; Tappert et al., 2009).
The keyboard dependency of personal 
identification by keystroke dynamics was 
studied by Matsubara et al. (2015). Chang 
(2012) suggests using keystroke dynamics for 
cryptographic purposes. An exhaustive review of 
KDA studies were published, such as Banerjee 
and Woodard (2012), Bhatt (2013), Kanimozhi 
and Kanimozhi (2015) and Pin et al. (2013), 
where authors compare methods, reference 
databases and errors within the authentication 
processes. All biometric authentication methods 
are based on the calculation of similarity 
between a template created by the proper user 
and an authenticated user’s sample in KDA 
usually the keystrokes (durations) and the times 
between keystrokes (latencies) are evaluated. 
Relatively different methods were suggested 
by Roth et al. (2013), when authors suggested 
KDA that authenticated a user by keystroke 
sounds. Especially in the last decade, various 
authors suggested using of soft computing 
methods, such as Ant Colony Optimization 
(ACO), Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO). 
The Genetic Algorithm (GA) is used together 
with Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) for 
feature subset selection as used by Karnan 
and Akila (2009) and Karnan and Akila (2010) 
respectively. These methods to learn by 
themselves require a big amount of data and 
therefore all these methods use a relatively 
large datasets for the teaching process which is 
their disadvantage.
2. Proposed Method
All previous methods are based on linear 
systems; i.e. the vector is composed of serial 
digraphs of the passwords and user’s ID 
respectively. However, it have to be noted that 
while the duration times are always positive, 
latency times may be both positive and 
negative, as is shown in Fig. 1.
Unlike existing approaches, our new 
approach is based on a rectangular system, 
using Pythagoras’ formula (see Fig. 2).
Registration phase of two-factor 
authentication proposed by us contains except 
ID and a password choice also biometrics 
enrolment processes when several samples 
of the user’s keystroke dynamics are obtained 
and processed (completeness control, quality 
control, features extraction…) to create 
a template in the form:
 (1)
where T is the keystroke dynamics template of 
a user, TD is the durations template of a user 
and TL is the latencies template of a user. 
The durations template TD and the latencies 
template TL of a user are expressed by (2) and 
(3) respectively.
Fig. 1: Duration and latency times
Source: own
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where tDj,i is the i-th duration time obtained 
from j-th sample, tLj,i is the i-th latency time 
obtained from the j-th sample, m is the number 
of samples and n is the number of duration/
latency times.
During the verification phase of 
authentication proposed of us, the user 
enters his or her ID and password and in the 
background, besides the password text the 
keystroke dynamics of the typing is measured. 
Principle of proposed two-factor authentication 
shows Fig. 3.
Fig. 2: Duration and latency times
Source: own
Fig. 3: Enrolment and login process
Source: own
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Generally, knowledge-based authentication 
through passwords is deterministic in its nature 
– the user both knows the password and enters 
it correctly or he does not. KDA, however, like 
most biometric authentication is stochastic in 
its nature. Both duration and latency times are 
stochastic variables whose values are influenced 
by random events. Therefore, they are not be the 
same for a given user every time. That is why it is 
necessary to set an appropriate tolerance level 
of dissimilarity between the keystroke dynamics 
obtained during the verification phase with the 
template stored in the system (see Fig. 4).
In our approach, we consider that 
certain characteristics are more significant 
for authentication purposes than others are. 
By other words, characteristics with a lower 
variance are more stable and therefore have 
a more significant role in a verification process 
than characteristics whose variance is high.
Consider that we obtain the following 
characteristics (4) during the verification phase:
 
(4)
where V is the keystroke dynamics obtained 
during verification and vi is the i-th digraph 
obtained during verification.




where viD is the duration time of the i-th digraph 
obtained during verification and viL is the 
latency time of the i-th digraph obtained during 
verification.
Then we can define the proposed measure 
of dissimilarity (hypotenuse) as (6):
 (6)
where dH(V, T) is the hypotenuse measure 
of dissimilarity between verification V and 
template T, d(vi , ti) is the distance between 
the i-th verification digraph and the i-th average 
template digraph and s(Ti) is the variance of 
the i-th digraph of the template. The superscript 
2nd above  in formula (6) shows that 
we want the second maximum value. It serves 
to eliminate the influence of exceptional random 
adverse effects on the authentication results.
Distance d(vi , ti) between the i-th 
verification digraph vi and the i-th average 
template digraph ti is that expressed as (7):
 (7)
where viD is the duration time of the i-th digraph 
of verification, viL is the latency time of the 
i-th digraph of verification, tiD is the average 
duration time of the i-th digraph of template and 
tiL is the average latency time of the i-th digraph 
of the template.
In the previous formula (7), the i-th average 
template digraph ti may be expressed as (8) 
and its constituent average duration time of the 
i-th digraph of template tiD and average latency 
Fig. 4: Comparison of template digraph with unknown user
Source: own
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time of the i-th digraph of template tiL can be 




where m is the number of samples for template 
creation, tDj,i is the duration time of the i-th 
digraph of template from the j-th sample and tLj,i 
is the latency time of the i-th digraph of template 
from the j-th sample.
Variance s(Ti) of the i-th digraph at template 
T is expressed as:
 (11)
3.	 Proposed	Method	Verification
To verify the proposed method it is necessary 
to obtain appropriate biometric data. We 
conducted a search of existing datasets and 
we hoped that we would find a dataset that 
would be suitable for verification of our method 
and for comparison of the results with existing 
methods.
The most frequently mentioned dataset was 
created by Killourhy and Maxion (2009) with 
the help of 51 subjects (typists) when all these 
subjects typed the same password (.tie5Roanl), 
and each subject typed the password 400 times 
over 8 sessions (50 repetitions per session). 
Firstly, we assume a certain influence of learning 
during repeated password entries and thus we 
believe that the dynamics of writing passwords 
for the fiftieth time will be quite different from 
when a user enters the password for the first 
time. Secondly, it is possible to assume that an 
experienced typist has his writing style more 
stabilized than a regular user who does not use 
the keyboard so often. Thirdly, we believe that 
users not choose for their passwords randomly 
generated strings that but they choose 
passwords that are easy to remember and easy 
to type. Fourthly, the results of the individual 
methods are presented here simplified only as 
Average Equal-Error Rate and its deviation. 
We think that a much more convenient tool for 
comparing different methods is the Detection 
Error Tradeoff (DET) graph than only one point 
on this graph. For these reasons, we do not 
consider this database as suitable for keystroke 
dynamics authentication methods validation in 
a real environment.
Another frequently mentioned dataset 
(Allen, 2010) was obtained with help of a 
pressure sensitive keyboard when three 
different passwords were typed: “pr7q1z”, 
“jeffrey allen” and “drizzle”. Overall 104 users 
were present on the database, but only seven 
of them provided a significant amount of data 
(between 89 and 504), whereas the other 97 
only provided between 3 and 15 samples. 
We consider that he number of participants 
who provided sufficient data is inadequate. 
Moreover, our goal is to propose a method 
of authentication that requires no special 
hardware, so this dataset is not suitable for our 
purposes as well.
The last dataset that is worth mentioning 
is the dataset by Bello et al. (2010) that was 
released in 2010. This dataset stores data from 
an experiment when 58 volunteers typed 14 
phrases extracted from books and 15 common 
UNIX commands. Unfortunately, it seems that 
almost all the users did only one session and 
therefore this dataset is not useable for us.
Because we consider these three mentioned 
datasets are not suitable for our purposes, we 
decided to create our own dataset for the model 
validation and comparison with current models 
of keystroke dynamics authentication. We 
developed experimental software that consists 
of four parts and serves for data collection and 
data analysis:
1. Client part – a graphic user interface that 
instructs a participant what to do; it contains 
an electronic form for entering a password and 
an algorithm for duration and latency times 
measured when the password is written.
2. Server part – an application that instructs 
the client part and communicates with it.
3. Database part – the place where the 
collected data are stored.
4. Analysis part – software that reads and 
selects data from the database and 
exports this data for analysis tools (Matlab, 
Statistica, SPSS).
The experiment where biometric data were 
collected can be divided to the two phases:
1. During the first phase, one of six possible 
passwords (dA7upR0k, eagle512, ext25ra8, 
eXt25rA8, facebook, standard) was 
randomly assigned by a system to every 
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participant (a college student). Afterwards, 
the participants were asked to register on the 
experimental software. During registration, 
the participants typed their passwords 
20 times. On the background, duration and 
latency times were automatically measured 
and saved to a database. This phase 
imitated the registration of the users.
2. During the second phase, the participants 
were asked to type the assigned password 
one time. This phase takes for three weeks 
and participants wrote their passwords 
usually one time per a week. Duration and 
latency times were automatically measured 
on the background and saved to a database. 
This phase imitated attempts of valid users’ 
verification.
During the verification phase of the 
authentication process, two types of end user 
can occur:
1. Valid users are those users who identify as 
themselves during the verification phase 
of the authentication process. Verifications 
of authorized users were simulated so 
that the individual measurements obtained 
in the second stage of data collection 
were compared with the data of the given 
participant obtained in the first stage of data 
collection.
2. Impostors are those users who identify 
through the identity of other users during 
the verification phase of the authentication 
process. Verifications of impostors 
were simulated so that the individual 
measurements obtained in the second 
stage of data collection were compared with 
the data of other participants (who had been 
assigned the same password) obtained in 
the first phase of data collection.
The result of the verification phase of the 
authentication process is the decision whether 
to accept the identification features presented 
by an authenticated person as a proof of his 
identity, or whether to refuse these features as 
proof of identity claiming. Of course, ideally, 
Fig. 5: Experimental software
Source: own
Password Participants Valid user attempts Impostor attempts
dA7upR0k 16 21 555
eagle512 25 69 2,256
eXt25rA8 26 57 2,075
ext25ra8 18 42 1,020
facebook 23 54 1,694
standard 26 43 1,725
Source: own
Tab. 1: Number of participants
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these features presented by valid users are 
always accepted and features presented by 
impostors are always rejected. Unfortunately, 
the result of this verification will be wrong 
decision when a valid user is rejected (false 
rejection) or an impostor is accepted (false 
acceptance). This is the reason why we choose, 
as a criterion for comparison of our model to 
contemporary models, a false acceptance ratio 









= lim  (13)
where NFA is the number of false acceptances, 
NIA is the number of impostor accesses, NFR 
is the number of false rejections and NVA is the 
number of valid accesses.
Of course, both FAR and FRR are 
theoretical values that are not known but can 
be estimated on the basis of the experiment, 
within which we find how many impostors are 
mistakenly accepted and how many valid users 
are mistakenly rejected.
It is necessary to note that the specific 
values of the FAR and FRR depends on the 
“tolerance” which is required when comparing 
the values obtained during verification and the 
values obtained during registration and stored in 
the system. With increasing tolerance, the FRR 
decreases while the FAR increases and vice 
versa. A convenient way to view the relationship 
of FAR and FRR at different tolerances is a 
Detection Error Tradeoff graph (DET graph) with 
one axis as the variable FAR and the second 
axis as the variable FRR. This graph can be 
also used for comparing multiple biometric 
authentication methods, which plots curves 
of these methods. A biometric authentication 
method where the curve lies under the curves 
of other methods is advantageous in terms of 
recognition accuracy. At the same, for the FAR 
value, it always has a lower FRR value than 
other methods of biometric authentication, and 
for the same FRR value it always has a lower 
FAR value.
Fig. 6 shows the result of the proposed 
method in comparison with the traditional 
Euclid method for the password “facebook”. 
It can be seen that the result of our proposed 
method is better, because the curve lies below 
the curve of the Euclid method. The results for 
other passwords are similar and always better 
than the Euclid method.
Fig. 6: Result of the Hypotenuse method
Source: own
EM_4_2020.indd   222 18.11.2020   12:28:38
2234, XXIII, 2020
Information Management
4. Comparison with Killourhy and 
Maxion Dataset
Although we have justified why the use of the 
reference database of Killourhy and Maxion 
(2009) is not appropriate for comparing 
individual methods of keystroke dynamics 
biometric authentication, we decided to 
compare the outputs of our method with others 
within this dataset. The result of our Hypotenuse 
method is compared with the most discussed 
methods in Tab. 2.
It has to be noted again that Average equal 
error rate is an only one point of a Detection 
error tradeoff curve and that is why this 
comparison is too simplified. Interesting results 
are seen when comparing these methods with 
different number of measurements (template 
size) for the template creation (see Fig. 7).
It can be seen for the small amount of 
template creation samples our hypotenuse 
method is more stable and it results in smaller 
Average equal error rate then other methods 
(see Tab. 3).
Fig. 8 shows comparison of different 
methods when only 5-size sample is used. This 
comparison proves the stability of our method.
5. Discussion and Future Work
Keystroke biometrics has an advantage over 
most other biometric authentication schemes, 
namely, user acceptance. Since users 
are already accustomed to authenticating 
themselves through usernames and passwords, 
most proposed keystroke biometric methods 
are completely transparent. By comparing 
Karnan et al. (2011), Killourhy and Maxion 






Tab. 2: Comparison with Killourhy and Maxion dataset
Fig. 7: Result of the Hypotenuse method with different template size
Source: own
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(2009) and our work it seems that the proposed 
methods are depend on a password, collecting 
methods and evaluation methodology.
Some may criticize this method of 
authentication as not very reliable. Certainly 
keystroke dynamics in comparison with 
something like iris scanning is not so stable and 
therefore has a higher probability of  and  errors. 
However, a method has no higher demands on 
equipment and end users.
The proposed method of authentication 
provides approximately 30% of identification 
of impostors without rejecting a legitimate user 
(without taking into account the knowledge part 
of this two-factor authentication). The great 
weakness of knowledge authentication via 
passwords is the risk of a successful dictionary 
or brute force attack. In the first case, the 
attacker checks if the password is not some 
commonly used words, in the latter case, the 
Fig. 8: Different methods with using 5-size sample
Source: own









Tab. 3: Different template size
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attacker sequentially checks whether the 
password is not an alphanumeric string. These 
attacks have a higher probability of success 
when the set of candidate passwords that must 
be tried is small. By incorporating authentication 
via keystroke dynamics, the set of candidate 
passwords significantly increases. The attacker 
would have to test not only the individual 
strings, but also the method of writing these text 
strings on the keyboard. The proposed method 
of two-factor authentication therefore does not 
require such high demands on strong password 
creation (random length, special characters, 
the use of uppercase/lowercase letters...) by 
the end users while maintaining a “reasonable” 
level of safety.
Conclusions
Password authentication in combination with 
keystroke dynamics authentication have a 
great potential. The user does not have to 
change their habits, nor even know when 
entering the password that its dynamics are 
measured. An attacker who wants to trick this 
authentication must guess not only the correct 
password, but must also type it correctly on the 
keyboard. This does not make it easier to use 
automated password attack tools; it is no longer 
possible to use a dictionary attack or brute force 
attack. Keyboard typing dynamics cannot be 
easily seen and recorded with a hidden camera 
(attack over shoulder).
However, the current methods of verifying 
the identity of the user through keyboard typing 
dynamics had a relatively large drawback that 
prevented their massive spread. They required 
a large number of measurements to create 
a relatively stable template against which 
subsequent accesses are verified. However, 
our proposed method returns relatively 
accurate results even with a small number of 
samples, which is especially important when 
the security policy requires the user to change 
the password frequently.
Of course, compared to other biometric 
systems, the  and  values are higher, but 
it is important to note that there is another 
authentication factor – the password. We 
believe that filtering out 30% of intruders without 
mistakenly rejecting a single valid user is a 
significant contribution to improving authentication 
security, especially when there is no need to 
incur additional high costs. Moreover, although 
this method of authentication is less reliable 
especially in comparison with physiological 
biometric methods, it requires no special 
equipment and is inexpensive. By incorporating 
keystroke dynamics into a knowledge-based 
authentication through passwords, these 
passwords significantly increase resistance 
against brute force and dictionary attack. Users 
will be allowed to choose more easily memorised 
passwords that cannot be noted.
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